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ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES EX CONTRACTU.'
"As damages," says Mr. Serjeant Sayer, in his treatise relative
thereto, "are a conslderable obiect in every mixed and in every
personal action, a complete and accurate knowledge of the law relative thereto is very useful to all persons engaged in theprofession
of the law, and particularly to those who are concerned in the
management of causes." Such a knowledge, let us add, is by no
means so much cultivated amongst our legal practitioners as it ought
to be,-an assertion, the truth of which may in part be established
by this fact, that, save the work by Mr. Serjeant Sayer just cited,
no law-writer in this country has directed his attention exclusively
to the subject of damages; nor in any of our standard treatises, or
books of practice, has the matter now before us attracted that attention which it manifestly deserves; the very able treatise of Mr.
Sedgwick, of the American bar, being the guide with us, as it is in
the United States, when difficulty is felt in regard to it.
Under these circurastances, we deem it expedient to inquire, so
far as our limits will permit, as to the leading principles upon which
damages ought to be awarded, and more especially as to s6dme moot
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points which will present themselves to the. notice of any one who
takes even a cursory survey of recent cases bearing upon the subject before us, adjudicated. in our 'Courts.
The term "damages," we may remark, is used as -synonymous
with "pecuniary compensation" for a wrong or injury inflicted by
one' person on another, ,recoverable by action; the expression,
"imeasure of damages," being, employed to indicate the "scale"
by reforence'to which damages are in any given case to be

agags.,

Important as it might appear to-be, that positive and definite
rules should exist for regulating the award of damages, and reasonable as might seem the -expectation .that such rules could readily
and accurately be traced out, we shall find that few intelligible
maxims of a precise and practical kind are to be'enunciated on this
aah!,*;t
had thai,
even in actione upon. contract, to which we shall
on this ocasion exclusively direct our attention, a rather wide disdtitdn is-if%*ed tthe joryin assessing damages, -with the exeraee of W*ijupIcious or unsatisfa~tory'as it may be, the 'Courts
at Wiaminstr will-ot*illingly inteere, save inileed .to prevent
e-fiTb-&ViousinRt
ast , or "to-st right the most palpable mis"irrtae.
The first question which demands attentidn in regard-to the mode
of-assessing damages in an action on contract, is this.-in such a
piroeeding, can tl~intention, animus, or motive ofthe party charged
be iiquired into? Can itpr6perly be taken into acbunt in estimating the damages ? Clearly, this cannot be "done: the inquiry
Pgested wouldbe wholly irrelevait to'the issue joined. In such
an action, the main questions fdr d6teimihation vil obiidimsyiteWhaj wiifshie contract? -Was it Uken"hyt 6dfendaiti? -f the
terms.of ihe contract in question 1 'se-eftained, Aid its 'breaeh be
proved, the only other inquiry will'bes to the amount of damages
tidbe *awrded; and in estimatig thtse dn mges, the motive or inQifion of the dfendent will be immsterial" 'If a man expressly
covenants, or on good legal 'consideration promises to do an act,
which he would not otherwise be bound to perform, he thus imposes
on himself a responsibility from which he cannot be relieved, unless
by duly discharging it, or by consent of thq contractee; and if
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guilty of a breach of his covenant or proriise, he is at law -ompell,
able to make compensation in damages to the party injured. It.is
well known, indeed, that the measure of damages in actions of
contract differs most materially from that applicable 'Mactions
of tort: in the latter class of cases the jury being- permitted to
take into consideration the. animus of the offending party, and to
assess the damages upon a general survey of all the circumstances
adduced: the verdict being thus sometimes made to operate not
mefely as compensatory, but to some extent by way of punishment.
Occasionally, even in actions of contract, a wide discretionary power
is assumed by the juiy in inflicting damages: from their hands
a defendant who, to breach of promise of marriage, has superadded
heartless conduct or insulting behavior, would, as we opine, find
but little mercy.
In an action founded upon contract, then, the breach being.
proved, damages, nominal or substantial, will follpw as a matter of
*course; and where an action is.brought for breach of a contract to
pay a ,certain and ascertained sum of money only, the remark of
Lord Mansfield, in Robinson vs. Bland, 2 Buar. 1077, seems applicable, that the action under such circumstances, does, from the very
nature of the case, become a suit for specific performance. To cases
of this kind we need not occupy time or space by further allusion:
in regard to them, the rule applicable being, that the amount which
would have been received if the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if it be broken." (Alder vs. Keighley, 15 M. &
IV. 117.) The rule thus tersely worded, holds true in a vast variety
of cases which present themselves in practice; ex. gr., where a covenant for the payment of money, a bond, bill of exchange, or promissory notp, is put in suit, or where an action, as often happens,
virtually undefended, is brought for the price of goods sold and delivered, for money lent, or for money due on an account, stated.
In such cases, the contracting parties themselves do in fact define
the precise amount of liability to be incurred for breach of
contract; and justice is done by giving effect to their stipulations.
If, however, the true measure of damages be not thus indicated,
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the rules which are to guide us to it are laid down in language someWhat vague-and general. Thus, "where a person makes a contract
and breaks it, he must pay the whole damage sustained." "Where
a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he-is, so
far as myoney -can do it, to 'be placed in the same situation, with
t respt to damages,, as if the contract had been performed." (See
Ra'nso vs. Barman, 1 Exch. 855, 856.) In order that rules
thus expressed may be useful and available to the practitioner, they
must he-attentively considered by him in connection with each respectively of the leading species of contracts, their operation in
each, such case when thus considered, being noted down ; in order
that they may be intelligible to a jury, their practical effect, with
regard to the facts before them, must fully be illustrated and explained. We shall here attempt, to a very limited extent only, thus
.to consider, illustrate, and explain them. and, in the first instance,
we will cull almost at random, from our voluminous reports, a case
or two of a simple kind, which may subserve this efid. A. being
indebted to B. for the price of goods sold .and delivered, gave to
this latter party a bil, drawn by himself (A.), to -get discounted
upon these terms: that B. should; out of the proceeds of the bill,
retain to his own use 1001. and the discount, and should pay over
the balance to A. Here the measure of damages, in an action by
A.'s assignees against B., was held to be the amount of the bill in
question, minus the 1001. and the discount. (Alder vs. Keighly,
ante.) *Again, C, having recovered a judgment for 2811. 3s. 6d.
against D., agreed with R. to forbear to sue out execution upon the
judgment until a future day; in consideration whereof, E. undertook that he would, on or before that day, erect a'substantial"
* dwelling-house, and cause a lease of the same-to be granted to C.,
such lease when granted to be in "satisfaction" of the judgment.
In an action by C. against E., for breach of this undertaking, the
measure of damages was held to be the value of that (viz., the
'lease of.the house in question) which the defendant had promised to
give in consideration 'of the plaintiff's forbearance. (Strutt vs.
.iarlar,16 M. & W. 249.) In either of the foregoing cases, nothing
nore was needed than strictly and literally to compensate the plain-
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tiff, by assessing his damages at that precise sum which he had lost
by the defendant's breach of contract.
Sometimes, however, the object here indicated is not so readily
to be accomplished; sometimes the rule for the adjustment of damages is ill-defined. Where the action "sounds in damages"(a phrase
by the bye, which Mr Sedgwick, in his Treatise on Damages, 2d
ed., p. 205, note, declares himself "not able to understand!"), that
is, where the recovery of damages,and not of a debt, is sought for, it
does not unfrequently happen that a jury finds itself imperatively
called upon to award, on evidence conflioting and unsatisfactory, a
precise sum, as accurately representing the damage sustained by
breach of contract, and, whilst fixing its amount, well known that,
after all without the slightest derelictiun of duty on their part, but
a rough approximation towards justice is thus effected. It not unfrequently happens, also, that the Court itself is puzzled in regard
to the true rule for the assessment of damages, to be applied.
What, for instance, it may be asked, in the case of a breach of
covenant to repair, is the true measure of damages? Is it, in accordance with the opinion of Lord Holt, the amount which would
be required to put the premises in question into repair ? Trivian vs.
Champion, 2 Lord Raymond, 1125. Is it the loss which -the
landlord would sustain, if he sold his reversion in the market? ag
Mr. Baron Martin appears on a recent occasion to have thought.
Smith vs. .Peat, 9 Exch. 161., The latter criterion, in support
whereof direct authority may be cited, would seem to be the most
correct and just.
How, again, in an action for breach of an agreement of hiring
and service, by a wrongful dismissal of the servant, should the
damages be computed? The just measure of damages would here
probably be attained by considering these two questions :-1lst.
What is the usual rate of wages for the particular employment ?
2d. What time will probably be lost before a similart engagement
can be found? (See per Erle, J., Beckham vs. -Jrake,2 H. L.
Cas. 606; per Orompton, J., £mmens vs. BElderton, 13 0. B. 508.)
Again, in an action for contribution, to reimburse one of several
joint contractors, who has paid the entire joint debt, or discharged,-
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nder compulsion, the entire joint liability, what pecuniary. amount
is the plaintiff entitled to claim., as again'st any one of his co-contractors ? It is curious to find that-this quegtion, primdfacie so simpie, and obvioisty of much practical importance; has but recently
been thoroughly sifted and examined. It was resolved by the
Court of Queen's Bench, in Bat r vs. Hawes, 2 E. &B. 287, in a
thain of reasoning ingenious and subtle, to which we would refer
the reader.
In cbnnection with the Contract of Sale, whether of land or personalty, various points of -more or less publicity invite attention.
C6ntracts for the sale of real estate are, it is well settled, understood
as having been made subject to the condition that the vendor has a
,god title ; so that when a pdrson contracts. to sell realty, there is
an implied understanding, that if (without fraud. on his part) the
e'ador f0i to make out a good title, the only damages recoverable
will be the erpenseg necessarily incurred by the vendee in inves."igatifig the title ; nominal damages only, under the circumstances
here supposed, being awarded to him for the loss of his bargain.
*(Sugd. V. & P., 11th ed., vol. i. p. 4 2 4 ). Every one who purchases
land, knows, or is presumed to know, that difficulties may exist as
to; the idisking 6f a title, which were not anticipated at the time of
signing the contract; and should the intended purchaser think proper to enter prematurely into possession of his contemplated purchase, and to incur expense in improvements and alterations to it
before the title is ascertained, he will do so at his own risk. (See
the judgment, 'Worthingtonvs. Warrington, 8 C.B. 134.) Such is
the general rule which determines the measure of damages in an
adtion against the vendor, for breach of a contract of sale of land,
ther being no fraud, nor (as in Hopkins vs., Grazebrook, 6 B. &
0. 81; -and Robinson vs. Harman, 1 Exch. 850) any gross imprudence; or willful misfeasance on his part. And on the other hand
where a party has been let into possession of land under a contract
of ptfrcase which he then-refuses to' complete, and no conveyance
is executed, it seems settled, too, that the vendor cannot recover.
from hhiih the whole 'amount of the purchase-money, but only the
•damages, actually sustained by his breach of contract; the mea-
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sure of damages, in an action of this nature, being the injury sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant not having performed his contract. (Laird vs..Pinn, 7 M. &W. 474.)
In cases such as we have just specified, the mode of determining
the damages recoverable for breach of contract is tolerably clear.
Should special circumstances, however; be introduced into any one
of them; should we, for instance, suppose that the purchaser of
land has himself, relying on the assurance of his vendor that a good
title could be made, to resell it before obtaining the conveyance to
himself, doubt would immediately be felt in regard to the precise
measure of- dimages to be applied; at all events, the pleader for
whose opinion such a state of facts was submitted would be driven
to a consideration of the doctrine respecting "remoteness of damage," to which we shall presently advert.
Let us next suppose that an action is brought for the non-delivery of the goods, pursuant to contract; the recognized measure of
damages in this case is the difference (if any) between the contract
price and the market price of the subject matter of the contract at
the time of its breach (Shaw vs. Holland, 15 M. &W. 136; Tempest vs. .ilner,-3 0. B. 249,) when the vendee, shouldhe previously
have resold the goods, ought at once to go into the market and
supply himself with the article in question, in order that he may
thus be enabled to fulfill his sub-contract. Peterson vs. Ayre, 13
C. B. 353. A like measure of damages is applicable also as against
the purchaser of goods, who in consequence of a falling market, refuses to accept them. Pkillpotts vs. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475.
Thus far, under ordinary circumstances, no difficulty presents itself.
Are we, however, to understand that the above rule is inflexible ?
Under no conceivable circumstances, for instance, can the vendee
recover as against his vendor the profits which would have accrued
from their resale ? This is ani important question, by way of answer whereto little direct authority can be found in our books. According to the Scotch law, it is clear that, under circumstances such
as supposed, the damages adverted to would be recoverable. For
this proposition the well-known case of Dunlop vs. Higgins, I Ho.

L. Cas. 381, is an express authority.

it is moreover very no-
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ticeable tiat, whilst moving judgment therein, the late Lord Chancellbr Cottenham evidently assumes that the English law is in confozmity with the conclusions which he then -arrives at in regard to
the law of Scotland.
'That was' an action for the breach of a contract to deliver iron;
and a' complete contract having been established, and its breach
shdwn, the truth of the following proposition was contended for on
behalf'of the defendants (the appellants): that in case of failure to
deliver'goods sold at a stipulated .price, and immediately deliverable, the true measure of damage is the differenee between the stipulated price'of the goods and their market price on or about the
day whereon the contract is broken, or at or about the time when
the 'purchaseT might have supplied himself. JIn discussing this
general proposition, the late Chancellor thus expresses himself:"What does the party come into Cqurt for ?-to obtain compensation for the other party not having performed his contract." * * *
",The jurors had to ascertainthe damage that had arisen from the
non-fulfilment of this contract." His lordship then 'proceeds to
illustrate the mode in which this might be done. Suppose, he says,
a party who has agreed to purchase' a certain quantity of iron on a
particular day, has himself entered into a contract with somebody
else, conditioned for the supply of that same quantity of iron, to be
then delivered, and that he, not being able to obtain the quantity
contracted for on that'particular day, loses the benefit arising from
the sub-contract. Assuming that the market price of iron had risen
in the meantime, the plaintiffs ought not only to recover the difference between the contract and the market price, " but also that
profit which would have been received if the party had performed
his contract." ,No other rule, proceeds his lordship, is reconcilable
with justice, nor with the duty which the jury had to performthat ofdecIding the amount of damage which the party had suffered
by the breach of his contract. "Most cases of contract vary from
each other; and whatever general rules there may be as to award-.
ing damages, they must be modified by the particular cases to
which they come to be applied."
His lordship thence concludes that the law of Scotland will do
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what a jury is called on to do here, viz,, effectuate and sanction the
reimbursing of the party who has sustained the loss by the original
contract, and that without reference to what the price of the article
at the particular time will produce.
The remarks thus made, although incidentally, by a judge so cautious and painstaking as Lord Cottenham, certainly merit our attention ; and with their tenor, the decision of the Court of Exchequer
in Waters vs. Towers, 8 Exch. 401, to which we shall presently advert, is in close conformity. The truth perhaps is, that the ordinary rule for assessing damages, on a refusal to accept or deliver
goods according to contract, may, under special circumstances, require modification. "if," says Mr. Justice Erle, in Beckham vs.
.Drake, 2 H. L. Cas. 607-8, "goods are not delivered or accepted
according to contract, time and trouble as well as expense, may be
required, either in getting other similar goods, or finding another
purchaser; and the damages ought to indemnify both for such time,
trouble, and expense, and for the difference between the market
price and the price contracted for."
Another state of circumstances also suggests itself, viz., where
the article contracted for does not appear to have any well-ascertained market value, In this case an investigation as to the constituent elements of the cost of its production or supply to the
party who has contracted to furnish it, may become necessary, and
the difference between such cost and the contract price will in such
case be the measure of damages; so that if the cost equals or exceeds the contract price, the damages will be merely nominal.
Upon this part of the subject, the case of Mastertonvs. The Mayor,
ft. of Brooklyn, 7 Hill. (U. S.) R. 61, well deserves our notice.
There the plaintiffs had contracted to procure, manufacture, and
deliver all such blocks of marble as might be requisite for the completion of a certain public building about to be erected .by them
under a contract with the defendants. The marble in question was
to be paid for by instalments as the work progressed: and immediately on signing the original agreement, the plaintiffs entered into
a sub-contract with other parties, K. & Co., for a regular supply of
the said marble. A small portion only of the marble having been

522

THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

delivered by the plaintiffs, and. pain for, according to their contract,
by the defendsnts, these latter parties suspended their building
operations, and refused further tq perform .their contract. Some
considerable time after this breach, but as appeared in, evidence,
before the contract could possiblT have been fully performed, the
plintiffs sued the defendants for breach of contract; and having
proved- their case, a question arose at Nisi Prius,and was subsequently, argued before the Supre~me 'Court of the State of New
York, as to the nature of the scale by which the damages under the
circumstances stated should be computed. The majority of the
Court were of opinion that the test to be applied was the difference
between the contract price of the marble and, that which obtained
in the market at the time when the contract was broken. "When,"
remaiks the Chief Justice, "the contract, as in this case, is broken
before the arrival of the time for full performance, and the opposite party elects to consider it in that light, the market price on
the day of the breach is to govern in the assessment of damages.
In other words, the damages are to be settled and ascertained according to the existing state of the market at-the time the cause of
action arose, and not at the time fixed for full performance." We
'may observe that the decision here arrived at has since been recognized in the United States (see Story vs. ne NZew York and HarZem Railroad Company, 2 Selden U. S. R. 85), and may probably
be thQught to accord in spirit with the decisions in this country.
Thus in Hockester vs. JDe La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, it was held
that a party to an executory agreement may, before the time for
executing it has arrived, break the agreement, either by .disabling
himself from fulfilling it, or by renouncing the contract ;-that an action will lie for such breach before the time has arrived for fulffment of the agreement; and that the injured party may either sue
immediately ex contractu,.or wait till the time has come when the
act was to be done, still holding it as prospectively binding for the
exercise of this option, which may be advantageous to the innocent
party, and cannot be prejudicial to the 'wrongdoer. And it was
further held that, in either case, the jury, in assessing the damages,
would bejustified in looking to all that had happened, or was likely
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to happen, to increase or mitigate the loss of the plaintiff, down to
the day of trial.
In cases such as we have above been alluding to, a question of
much difficulty not unfrequently presents itself,-When .may damage properly be regarded as "too remote" to be recoverable by action? In other words, what degree of connection' between the
breach of contract complained of and the damage sustained thereby,
ought to exist in order that the party aggrieved may legally be entitled to compensation in respect of the latter? Common sense
suggests that some limit should be assigned to the chain of events
or circimstances linking together effect and cause; 'that the maxim,
injure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur,'must in some sort*
be observed.
The subject of "remoteness of damage" in an action of contract
was much considered by the Court of Exchequer in a recent case,
.adley vs. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 841, where the following rule in
regard to it is laid down: that when the parties " have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other
party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract, should
be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things, from such
breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they
made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it."
Where (as the Court in the case just cited proceed to remark) h contract is made with reference to special circumstances,and such special circumstances are communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and are thus known to both the contractingparties, the damages which might reasonably be contemplated as likely to result
from a breach of such contract would be the amount of injury which
would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under the special
circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other
hand, if the special 6ircumstances were wliolly unknown to the party
breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in its contemplation the amount of injury which would
arise generally, and, in the great multitude of cases not affected by

524

THE MEASURE QF DAMAGES.

any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract.. For,
had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have
specially provided for the event of--a breach of contract occurring,
by special terms as to the damages to be paid in such case; and of
this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them.
The facts in Radley vs. Baxendale having been stated in a recent Number of this Magazine,1 need not just now be recapitulated;
with this case, however, should be compared two previously adjudged oases Black vs. Bazendale, 1 Exch. 410, and Waters vs.
Towers, 8 Exch. 401. In the former of these cases, the plaintiff
had sent certain goods by the defendants, who were carriers, to a
country town, intending that they should arrive in time.for the
market there on a certain day, of which intention, however, the defendants had no notice. In consequence of the non-delivery of the
goods by the defendants within reasonable time, expenses were incurred in removing them for sale to another place; and the jury included the amount of such expenses in their verdict. - The Court of
'Exchequer seem to have thought that the jury were wrong in so
doing, but, as the amount of their verdict was under 201., refused,
in accordance with the recognized rule in such cases, to grant a new
trial. "1f,"said Pollock, U. B., "the carriers had had distinct
notice that the goods would be required to be delivered at a pdrticular time, perhaps they would have been liable for those expenses
for which, without such notice, they would not be liable; but
whether any particular class of expenses is reasonable or not, depends upon the usage of trade, and various other circumstances ;"
remarks which do not seen to conflict with the well considered
judgment of the Court of Exchequer in .adly vs. Baxendale. In
Waters vs. Towers, ante, the ilaintiffs were hld entitled to recover,
under a declaration for breach of contract in not fitting up certain
mill-gearing in a workman-like manner, and completing the .work
within a reasonable time, loss of profit which might have been made
by the plaintiffs on a sub-contract for the supply of certain articles
to be manufactured by them for a third party. And in this case
I See the Law, Magazine for August, 1854, p. 18 (Digest).
commented upon in an article in 2 Am. Law Reg. 641.)

(This case is also
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Mr. Baron Alderson is reported to have made this interlocutory
remark, that "1the existence of a contract, i9 evidence of.the probable amount of loss sustained. Suppose the plaintiffs had said, ' We
should have made such and such a contract if the defendants had performed theirs,' and the jury believed that the plaintiffs would have
done so, that would surely have been evidence of the amount of loss
occasioned by the defendant's breach of contract." The learned
judge, however, would here seem to be laying down a wide, and, as
we conceive, a rather dangerous doctrine, at variance, too, with the
judgment in Hadley vs. Baxendale, where the fact of notice of the
sub-contract having been given to a defendant under the circumstances suggested, or having been in some way brought within his
knowledge, is specified as most material in regard to his liability.
Various authorities, moreover, might be cited in opposition to the
above-mentioned dictum of the learned baron: thus, in an action for
breach of warranty of a horse, the loss of a bargain for the resale
of the horse cannot be recovered as special damage. Clare vs.
Maynard, 6 Ad. & E. 519. And the decision in ifanslip vs. Padwick, 5 Exch. 615, in reference to a contract for the sale of realty,
to which the vendor has failed to make a title, is strongly to a like
effect.
A review, however, of decided cases, seems to show that the rule
has not been uniformly observed, or very clearly settled, as to the
right of a party to claim a loss of profits as a part of the damages
for breach of a special contract. Perhaps the best practical test
which can be suggested for application is that laid down in Fox vs.
Harding,7 Cushing (U. S.) R. 522-3; viz., that if the profits
claimed are such as would have accrued and grown out of the contract itself, as the-direct and immediate results of its fulfilment,
then they would form a just and proper item of damages to be recovered against the delinquent party upon a breach of the agreement. The realization of such profits as are here indicated, may,
indeed, be considered as forming part and parcel of the contract
itself, and must have been in the contemplation of the parties when
the agreement was entered into; but if the profits in question are
such as would have been realized by the party from other indepen-
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dent and 6b'iateral undertakings, although entered into in couse-

quence and on the faith of the principal contract, there they are too
uncertain and remote to be taken into consideration as a part of the
damages occasioned by the breach of the contract in suit.
To illustrate what has been just said, let us take the case of a
special contract, whereby one party to it agrees to make certain
machines for the other, who, on his side, agrees to furnish, from
time to time, the materials necessary for their construction; let us
further suppose a breach of this contract by neglect to furnish materials; then the bther party would clearly be entitled to recover
the profit which would have accrued to him out of the contract if it
had been fulfilled. But if the -party suing for damages were to
offer to prove in addition to tits, that in consequence of the breach
of contract 'by the defendant, he (the plaintiff) had lost other contracts by which he would have realized large profits, the evidence
ths -proffered -would be wholly inadmissible, because such collateral
undertakings were not necessarily connected with the principal
contract, and could not reasonably be supposed to have been taken
into consideration when it'was entered into. Such profits would be
too uncertain, remote, and speculative in their nature to be recoverable as special damages.
In connection with the foregoing observations, which have been
abridged from the American case of Fox vs. Hardingmay be consulted Stanton vs. Collier, which recently came before our own
Court of Queen's Bench, and is reported in 8 E. &B. 274. There
tie plaintiff (who was a printer) declardd for the breach of a contract to re.deliver a printing-machine held as security for money
due to him by the defendant, and which was to be re-delivered to
the plaintiff upon certain stipulated terms. The damage alleged
was, 'that by reason of the non-delivery of this machine, the plaintiff had lost great gains and profits, which would have resulted to
him from its use; that his entire business and trade had been ruined,
and that he had thereby become insolvent. Now, although no express decision was given by the Court upon the question whether
the damage thus alleged was too remotely connected with the wrong
done to be recoverable, it would certainly seem to be so; and it is
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clear that the proper compensation, in the absence of special facts,
would have been the value of the machine itself.
So, in Theobald vs. The Railway Passengers' Assurance Company, 10 Exch. 15, where the action, in form ex contractu, was
brought to recover compensation from the defendants, in respect of
an injury sustained by the plaintiff, one of their insured, whilst
travelling by railway, the true measure of damages was held to be
compensation for the personal injury resulting from the accident,
not exceeding, however, the sum which the company would have
been liable to pay in the case of death, and irrespective of any loss
of time or profits consequential on such injury: for "what the insurance company calculate on indemnifying the party against, is
the expense, and pain, and loss immediately connected with the accident, and not remote consequences that may follow, according to
the business or profession of the passenger."
The cases latterly cited certainly throw some light upon the
doctrine concerning "remoteness of damage," and upon what is
meant by saying that, under ordinary circumstances, loss recoverable for breach of contract must be such as would naturally flow
from the breach alleged. It cannot, however, be denied that the
subject in question is still involved in considerable obscurity, which
much time and litigation will be needed to dispel.
Thus far on the present occasion have we spoken touching the
measure of damages in actions founded upon contract, not so much
with a view to obviating or removing difficulties which may suggest
themselves to him who cautiously explores the region through which
we have but rapidly been passing, as in the hope that some deductions practically important may thence be drawn. We have shown
(and a cloud of additional authorities might have been cited in
support of the assertion) that, for an accurate assessment of damages
in all, save the simplest, cases, two things are necessary i-- first, a
careful sifting and balancing of the evidence adduced ; secondly,
the application to that evidence of rules of law; couched not seldom
in language which, if not vague or indefinite, at all events cannot
readily be rendered intelligible to non-professionals.
Bearing this in mind, remembering also what has been already
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intimated, that the damages in an action ex contractu should be
assessed dispas8ionately,irrespective of the motive or animus which
may have prompted to the breach complained of; we find ourselves
impelled to this conclusion, that a jury of twelVe honi et legales
homines does not in very many cases which are now usually submitted to them, present the best medium through which the amount
of'pecuniary compensation payable tb one aggrieved by breach of
contract, may be determined; that the ends of justice would more
surely be accomplished if in the class of cases adverted to, the
judge were substituted for the jury as assessor between the litigating
parties. 'The first section of the Common Law Procedure Act,
1854, does indeed enact tftat an i8sue of fact, by consent of the
partie8, subject to the discretion of the Court in bane, or a judge at
Chambers, "may be tried and determined, and damages assessed
where necessary, in open Court, by any judge who might otherwise
have presided at the trial thereof by jury;" and that the verdict of
such judge "shall be of the same effect as the verdict of a jury,
save that it shall not be questioned upon the ground of being against
the weight of evidence." We fear, however, that of these provisions,
useful and excellent in tendency .hough they be, suitors will not
be found in practice often t6 avail themselves; and we think that
some further progress in the direction thus indicated may in all
likelihood; when the working of recent enactments has been marked
and tested, advantageously be made. To the suggestion thus put
forth we shall recur in our next number, when we propose to direct
attention to some points of difficulty connected with the measure of
damages in actions founded upon tort.
[We have inserted the foregoing article from the London Law
Magazine, both as an evidence of the increasing attention which is
paid in England to American decisions and text writers, and as in
itself a clear and able discussion of a diicult question. With the
conclusions of the writer, we agree in the main. But we cannot
let pass without some expression of dissent, the proposition that
damages in actions ex contratu ought to be assessed in all cases,
"irrespective of the motive or anims which may have prompted to
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the breach." We cannot admit that such is or should be the law.
On the contrary, we are convinced that good sense and natural
justice indicate, and demand, where it can be fairly applied, a distinction between the failure to comply with an agreement arising
from causes beyond the control of the party, or attributable only to
ordinary negligence, unskillfulness and the like, and the violation of
a contract, through malice, fraud, or that gross negligence which
in its recklessness of the rights of others, is viewed by the law as
next to fraud, dolo proxina. We do not now desire to argue in
favor of the application of vindictive or punitory damages in this
connection, though we think it quite susceptible of justification. It
is with reference to compensatory damages alone, that we would
insist upon the validity and importance of the distinction which we
have stated.
We are willing for the present, to assent to the doctrine that the
object of a civil action is merely the enforcement of compensation
for an injury suffered. What then? Compensation ought to extend
to every species of hurt or damage which is inflicted by the
wrongful act of another, so far as it is capable of pecuniary
estimation. Nothing less than this will square with the principles of abstract justice. The injured party has, according to,
strict theory, the right to demand to be replaced exactly in the
situation which he would have occupied had not the wrong
occurred. So far we proceed on the supposition that the party
injuring has no rights to be considered, and that practical and
abstract justice are co-extensive. But this obviously is not always.
the case. Where one of the parties to a contract fails to comply
with its terms, through accident or even negligence, where- not
culpable, it would not be equitable to visit upon him the extremerigor of the law. He may justly claim not to be liable for more
than the natural or necessary consequences of his conduct. - We.
may even consider it implied in every contract, that in case of*the
inability of either party to comply with its stipulation, without fault,
he is not to be held liable for any consequences therefrom which
could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time the contract
was formed,-that is to say, for any but its natural and probable
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consequences. If this were not the case, -no man' would enter
into any agreement. In cases of this nature, consequently, the
-party affected is entitled only to-partial and limited redress, and
must by reason of the reciprocal rights of ihe ofher party, be content to bear himself, some of the consequences of a comparatively
blameless act or 6mission.
We may consider, therefore, that in an action for breach of contract, two elements enter into the consideration of the measure of
damages; (1) the right of the plaintiff to complete compensaiion, (2)
the claim of the -defendant to have this abstratt right restricted
within limits, to be ascertained in accordance with -the nature of
the original-contract.
. Now, when we come to consider the case of a malicious, fraudulent, or reckless violation of an agreement, we readily perceive that
the second of the elements we have specified, ceases to have a just
application. The defendant has forfeited any*claim to insist upon
a limitation-of the abstract rights of the plaintiff, or upon a recourse
to any implied term in the .contract, which he has thus chosen to
abrogate and ignore. He has voluntarily placed himself in- the
position of a mere tort-feasor. Hence, we have nothing to consider
but the single element of compensation to the injured party. Now
in few, if any, cases, can damages, measured according to the natural
and probable consequences of a breach of contract, afford anything
like complete pecuniary compensation. The loss of contingent
profits, of time, of expected bargains, injuries flowing from the consequent violation of agreements which the party has entered into on
the faith of the completion of the contract, from the disarrangement
of his plans, and many other such substantive injuries, while they.
would not have been foreseen, and cannot be brought within the
general definition, are not the less zeal and hurtful to him, or susceptible of estimation in money. He cannot be replaced in his
former position, and abstract justice be satisfied, unless he obtain
redress as to these also. The necessary consequence is, that under
the circumstances, the plaintiff must be entitled to recover for some,
if not all injuries of the nature we have referred to, as well as for
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those which are directly and necessarily consequent upon the
wrong complained of.
This view of the question furnishes a complete refutation of the
fallacy so often put forward, that as the party injured' suffers to
the same extent, whether the motives of the other were good or
bad, so the claim to compensation must be the 'same in either
case. The answer is, that where the motives of the latter were
innocent, he can justly demand and does obtain a limitation of
the compensation to be made; but, in the opposite case, no
such controlling element exists, and full compensation ought to
be exacted.
The arbitrary distinction, indeed, between actions in contract
and in tort, in this respect, which is a consequence of this fallacy,
is without any foundation in reason or analogy. Evidence in mitigation or aggravation of damages, is admitted without'objection in
the one, why not in the other? The only difference between the
two is, that in tort, it may perhaps be assumed, in the first instance,
that as there was no previous relation between the parties, the
wrong was a deliberate and intentional one. But this, if true,
would only have the effect of throwing the burden of proof of
intention, in the case of contract, on the plaintiff ; and, if it were
proved, then the culpability of the defendant would be so much
the'greater, since he has superadded to a tortious act a breach of
good faith. The non-flfilment of an engagement,- indeed, is
neither more nor less than an injury to a right; and an attack on
person or property is nothing else. For illustration's sake, suppose
a banker, maliciously desiring to injure a depositor,- refuses payment of a draft, having ample funds to meet it, and knowing that
his act will produce bankruptcy, and for that very purpose.
What difference is there, either in morality or in law, between
such an act, and actual theft of so much money for -the same
purpose? Why then. should there be a difference in the damages
recovered ?
The view which we have taken, moreover, is that which is most
in accordance with our instincts of justice, and with the policy
of the law. One of the highest objects of any system of jurisprudence, is the rigid enforcement of good faith and fair dealing.
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In no country, much less in a commercial country, ought a -man
to be permitted to profit by the violation of a contract; yet the
adoption of an unvarying rule, 'which restricts compensation to
the natural consequences of the wrong, permits 'a man who finds
that he can make a better bargain as to his time, his money, his
property, than one which he has already entered into, to violate
the latter with comparative impunity. Fraud, malice, caprice, are
thus -placed on the same footing with honest error, or blameless
misfortune.
These conclusions are not speculative, nor the result of logical
abstraction, but are embodied in every system of Jurisprudence, and
in every civilized country, unless the Common Law form an exception. The Roman Law, and the countries in Europe and America
which arp.governed by.its principles, adopt precisely the distinctions
which we have contended for.' We cannot affirm, indeed, that so
far they have received entire sanction in our own law, which is
quite unsettled on the subject, but we cannot doubt, from the tendency of the authorities on analogous questidns, that it will not be
long before they shall. Some cases have already recognized their
propriety,2 and time, we hope, will add to their number.-EDs.
Am. LAw RE4.]
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